CVE and update status of the FreeBSD ports tree4,526 unaddressed CVEs in 616 portsAll times are CET

CVE details

CVE-2016-7055

There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.

Score
5.9 medium
Published
2017-05-04
Links
NVD · cve.org

Affected ports (1)

PortPackageVersionStatusMaintainer
security/openssl-unsafeopenssl-unsafe1.0.2.20170706unaddressedbrnrd@FreeBSD.org

VuXML

Template for a VuXML entry

Range taken from the CVE record, check it before committing. make newentry in security/vuxml creates the vid.

  <vuln vid="FIXME (make newentry)">
    <topic>FIXME -- FIXME</topic>
    <affects>
      <package>
	<name>openssl-unsafe</name>
	<range><lt>1.0.2k</lt></range>
      </package>
    </affects>
    <description>
      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
	<p>There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
	multiplication procedure in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c that
	handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis
	suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are
	impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in
	operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's
	direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient
	authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous
	outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among
	EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
	presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
	detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely.
	Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the
	server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is
	default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be
	affected.</p>
      </body>
    </description>
    <references>
      <cvename>CVE-2016-7055</cvename>
      <url>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7055</url>
    </references>
    <dates>
      <discovery>2017-05-04</discovery>
      <entry>2026-10-25</entry>
    </dates>
  </vuln>