CVE details
CVE-2021-21295
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
Affected ports (1)
| Port | Package | Version | Status | Maintainer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| java/netty | netty | 4.1.53_2 | unaddressed | glewis@FreeBSD.org |
Template for a VuXML entry
Range taken from the CVE record, check it before committing. make newentry in security/vuxml creates the vid.
<vuln vid="FIXME (make newentry)">
<topic>FIXME -- FIXME</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>netty</name>
<range><lt>4.1.60</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application
framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance
protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2)
before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables
request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the
original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by
`Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long
as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request
comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain
objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via
`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child
channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this
may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the
content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the
request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1
connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be
checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets
downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the
linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is
true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used,
`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1
objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote
peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user
can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom
`ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind
`Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.</p>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<cvename>CVE-2021-21295</cvename>
<url>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21295</url>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2021-03-09</discovery>
<entry>2026-10-25</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>