CVE-2026-26007

Range taken from the CVE record, check it before committing. make newentry in security/vuxml creates the vid.

  <vuln vid="FIXME (make newentry)">
    <topic>FIXME -- FIXME</topic>
    <affects>
      <package>
	<name>py312-cryptography-legacy</name>
	<range><lt>46.0.5</lt></range>
      </package>
    </affects>
    <description>
      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
	<p>cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives
	and recipes to Python developers. Prior to 46.0.5, the
	public_key_from_numbers (or EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()),
	EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key(), load_der_public_key() and
	load_pem_public_key() functions do not verify that the point belongs
	to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve. This missing
	validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point P from a
	small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various
	situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification
	(ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes
	the shared secret as S = [victim_private_key]P via ECDH, this leaks
	information about victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order). For
	curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of
	the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's
	easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup. Only SECT curves are
	impacted by this. This vulnerability is fixed in 46.0.5.</p>
      </body>
    </description>
    <references>
      <cvename>CVE-2026-26007</cvename>
      <url>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26007</url>
    </references>
    <dates>
      <discovery>2026-02-10</discovery>
      <entry>2026-10-26</entry>
    </dates>
  </vuln>