CVE details
CVE-2026-47691
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Affected ports (1)
| Port | Package | Version | Status | Maintainer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| java/netty | netty | 4.1.53_2 | unaddressed | glewis@FreeBSD.org |
Template for a VuXML entry
Range taken from the CVE record, check it before committing. make newentry in security/vuxml creates the vid.
<vuln vid="FIXME (make newentry)">
<topic>FIXME -- FIXME</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>netty</name>
<range><lt>4.1.135</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol
servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final,
Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of
NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an
authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for
parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In
`io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add`
method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the
record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the
`handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the
ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache`
under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules,
where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to
provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is
then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key.
Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<cvename>CVE-2026-47691</cvename>
<url>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47691</url>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2026-06-12</discovery>
<entry>2026-10-25</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>