CVE-2026-110952
A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default. Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0. Resolution: - From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.
- Score
- –
- Published
- 2026-10-28
- Links
- NVD · cve.org · Report wrong data
Matched ports (1)
| Port | Package | Version | Status | Maintainer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| net/kafka | kafka | 4.3.1 | unaddressed | timp87@gmail.com |
Template for a VuXML entry
Package names, ranges and the XML itself can be wrong. Always check the content before you commit it, and run make validate in security/vuxml. The generator is being rewritten from scratch.
Range per package from the CVE record, for ports with a version line in their name (python312) only from that line. make newentry in security/vuxml creates the vid.
<vuln vid="FIXME (make newentry)">
<topic>FIXME -- FIXME</topic>
<affects>
<package>
<name>kafka</name>
<range><lt>4.4.0</lt></range>
</package>
</affects>
<description>
<body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<p>A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using
the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature,
but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured:</p>
<p>- The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when
sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a
validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted
regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is
required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it
is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted.
(A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected
audience is configured.)</p>
<p>Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional
(Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0).</p>
<p>Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS
endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant
identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys):
a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience,
may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged
principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls
the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited.
The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is
distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated
tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience
checks are not enforced by default.</p>
<p>Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both
sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value)
and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your
brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform
exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have
been available since 3.1.0.</p>
<p>Resolution: - From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS
endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer
and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default).
Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or
audience may opt out per axis with
sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or
sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.</p>
</body>
</description>
<references>
<cvename>CVE-2026-110952</cvename>
<url>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110952</url>
</references>
<dates>
<discovery>2026-10-28</discovery>
<entry>2026-10-28</entry>
</dates>
</vuln>