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CVE details

CVE-2026-111115

Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions read a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retain a RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. That count was bounded only by the outer request frame size (socket.request.max.bytes); it was not checked against the remaining buffer bytes or capped. Because each entry can be encoded in as little as two bytes (unknown tag 0, size 0), a modest request can declare tens of millions of tagged fields and force one object allocation per declared field. Flexible request headers (header version 2, used by flexible APIs such as ApiVersions v3) are parsed this way, so the amplification applies to the request header itself. Impact: The flexible request header is parsed on the network thread before authorization, request dispatch, and request-time quota accounting. A client can send a request of a few tens of megabytes whose header declares about 20 million tagged fields, forcing roughly that many RawTaggedField allocations and exhausting broker heap or inducing process-wide GC stalls, denying broker service. Because the header is parsed for pre-authentication APIs such as ApiVersions (v3), the allocation can occur before authentication; no Kafka resource ACL or quota is required. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers bounds-check the tagged-field count for flexible-versioned messages, rejecting a negative count, a count exceeding the remaining buffer bytes, or a count exceeding a fixed maximum (10,000), before any per-field allocation.

Score
–
Published
2026-10-28
Links
NVD · cve.org · Report wrong data

Matched ports (1)

PortPackageVersionStatusMaintainer
net/kafkakafka4.3.1unaddressedtimp87@gmail.com

Template for a VuXML entry

This generator is not reliable at the moment

Package names, ranges and the XML itself can be wrong. Always check the content before you commit it, and run make validate in security/vuxml. The generator is being rewritten from scratch.

Range per package from the CVE record, for ports with a version line in their name (python312) only from that line. make newentry in security/vuxml creates the vid.

  <vuln vid="FIXME (make newentry)">
    <topic>FIXME -- FIXME</topic>
    <affects>
      <package>
	<name>kafka</name>
	<!-- no fixed version in the CVE record -->
	<range><lt>FIXME</lt></range>
      </package>
    </affects>
    <description>
      <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
	<p>Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions
	  read a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retain a
	  RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. That count was bounded
	  only by the outer request frame size (socket.request.max.bytes); it
	  was not checked against the remaining buffer bytes or capped. Because
	  each entry can be encoded in as little as two bytes (unknown tag 0,
	  size 0), a modest request can declare tens of millions of tagged
	  fields and force one object allocation per declared field. Flexible
	  request headers (header version 2, used by flexible APIs such as
	  ApiVersions v3) are parsed this way, so the amplification applies to
	  the request header itself.</p>
	<p>Impact: The flexible request header is parsed on the network thread
	  before authorization, request dispatch, and request-time quota
	  accounting. A client can send a request of a few tens of megabytes
	  whose header declares about 20 million tagged fields, forcing roughly
	  that many RawTaggedField allocations and exhausting broker heap or
	  inducing process-wide GC stalls, denying broker service. Because the
	  header is parsed for pre-authentication APIs such as ApiVersions (v3),
	  the allocation can occur before authentication; no Kafka resource ACL
	  or quota is required.</p>
	<p>Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until
	  then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access
	  to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure.</p>
	<p>Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated
	  readers bounds-check the tagged-field count for flexible-versioned
	  messages, rejecting a negative count, a count exceeding the remaining
	  buffer bytes, or a count exceeding a fixed maximum (10,000), before
	  any per-field allocation.</p>
      </body>
    </description>
    <references>
      <cvename>CVE-2026-111115</cvename>
      <url>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111115</url>
    </references>
    <dates>
      <discovery>2026-10-28</discovery>
      <entry>2026-10-28</entry>
    </dates>
  </vuln>